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COMMENTS 
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING, CRIMINAL 
CONTEMPT OF COURT, AND THE DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY CLAUSE: A 
RECOMMENDATION FOR STATE COURTS 
Valerie Brummel* 
 
In states such as Illinois, courts invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause of 
the United States Constitution to protect parental kidnappers who have 
already been held in contempt of court from subsequent prosecution under 
state child kidnapping laws. State courts should not apply the Double 
Jeopardy Clause to protect parental kidnappers; instead, they should follow 
the example of the Ohio state courts by recognizing that contempt of court 
and child kidnapping are not the same crime for double jeopardy purposes. 
The many differences between the crimes of contempt and parental 
kidnapping, the disparity between sanctions delivered by the court for 
contempt and outlined by state legislatures for child kidnapping, and the 
inability of contempt sanctions to adequately punish parental kidnappers 
for the harm inflicted on their children, all provide reasons why the Double 
Jeopardy Clause should not apply to contempt of court and child 
kidnapping. This recommendation will help state courts better deter and 
punish parental kidnapping. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the event of a divorce, parents become subject to court-issued child 
custody orders, which dictate how much time they can spend with their 
children and where the children will live.1  When a parent decides to 
disobey the child custody order and deprive the other parent of her legal 
right to custody, he has committed parental kidnapping.2  In 2010, the 
 
1  Margaret M. Mahoney, The Enforcement of Child Custody Orders by Contempt 
Remedies, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 835, 836 (2007). 
2  Id.; see also William B. Johnson, Kidnapping or related offense by taking or removing 
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United States Department of Justice estimated that more than 200,000 
children are victims of parental kidnapping each year.3  In 2014, 
HealthResearchFunding.org reported that domestic parental child abduction 
figures are expected to increase by 20% annually in the coming years.4 
In 1980, Congress passed the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 
(PKPA) to fight parental kidnapping.5  Subsequently, all fifty states adopted 
the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and imposed 
criminal liability for parental kidnapping; some even went so far as to label 
parental kidnapping a felony.6  However, some state courts have applied the 
double jeopardy rule to protect parental kidnappers, undermining efforts by 
Congress and state legislatures to punish and deter parental kidnapping.7  
These courts claim that a double jeopardy problem arises where a violating 
parent is guilty of both the crime of parental kidnapping and criminal 
contempt of court.8  In addition to breaking state criminal laws, a parent 
who retains or removes his child in violation of a child custody order has 
also disobeyed the court that issued the order; thus, the court can hold the 
parent in contempt for his disrespectful conduct.9  Accordingly, some courts 
have held that the double jeopardy rule bars the subsequent prosecution of a 
criminal contemnor under state criminal statutes.10 
 
of child by or under authority of parent or one in loco parentis, 20 A.L.R.4th 823, 823 
(1983) (stating that criminal statutes on parental kidnapping make it unlawful for a person to 
(1) take a child (2) with the intent to detain and conceal such child from a parent or other 
lawful custodian). 
3  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CRIME OF FAMILY ABDUCTION: A CHILD AND PARENT’S 
PERSPECTIVE 4 (May 2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/229933.pdf [hereinafter 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE]. 
4  40 Uncommon Parental Child Abduction Statistics, HEALTHRESEARCHFUNDING.ORG 
(Nov. 22, 2014), http://healthresearchfunding.org/40-uncommon-parental-child-abduction-
statistics [hereinafter HEALTHRESEARCHFUNDING.ORG]. 
5  28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980). 
6  Kathi L. Grasso et al., The Criminal Justice System’s Response to Parental Abduction, 
JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, 1 (Dec. 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/186160.
pdf; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A–6–45(c) (West 2010); ALASKA STAT. ANN.§ 11.41.320(b) 
(West 2016), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18–3–304(1) (West 2009), IOWA CODE ANN.§ 710.6 
(West 2010). 
7  See, e.g., In re Marriage of D’Attomo, 570 N.E.2d 796, 802 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
8  See, e.g., id. at 796; People v. Rodriguez, 514 N.E.2d 1033, 1037–38 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1987); People v. Howard, 686 P.2d 644, 649 (Cal. 1984); State v. Hope, 449 So.2d 633, 636 
(La. Ct. App. 1984); see also Jay M. Zitter, Contempt finding as precluding substantive 
criminal charges relating to the same transaction, 26 A.L.R.4th 950 (1983). 
9  See D’Attomo, 570 N.E. 2d at 796; see also Zitter, supra note 8, at 950. 
10  See, e.g., In re Marriage of D’Attomo, 570 N.E.2d at 802; Fierro v. State, 653 So. 2d 
447, 448–49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1995); State v. Desselle, 809 So. 2d 460, 466–67 
(La. Ct. App. 2001). 
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Carlson v. Carlson11 demonstrates the potential disparity between 
sanctions for criminal contempt and the sentencing guidelines of the 
applicable state parental kidnapping statute.12  In Carlson, the judge held a 
parent in criminal contempt for violation of a child custody order and 
decided that the sanction would be incarceration for five hours, “until 5:00 
p.m. that day.”13  However, under Georgia’s state criminal statute outlawing 
parental kidnapping, the parent could have either been fined between $200 
and $500, or been imprisoned for between one and five months, or both.14  
Another parent in Georgia who effectively commits the same crime at issue 
in Carlson could face a much harsher punishment: if the state prosecuted 
him or her under Georgia’s criminal statute, that parent could face at least a 
$200 fine or a month of imprisonment.15 
As Carlson demonstrates, applying the double jeopardy rule to protect 
parents guilty of criminal contempt can lead to disparate results.  This 
Comment outlines four reasons why the double jeopardy rule should not 
apply to criminal contemnors.  First, under the Blockburger “same 
elements” test, the crimes of contempt and parental kidnapping contain 
distinct elements: contempt requires the existence and violation of a court 
order while parental kidnapping does not necessarily include such an 
element, and parental kidnapping requires intent to detain or conceal the 
child while criminal contempt includes no such element of intent.16  
Second, the crime of criminal contempt and the crime of parental 
kidnapping contain significant differences such as purpose and the role of 
the jury in the criminal proceedings.17  These differences demonstrate that 
the legislature may not have intended for criminal contempt and parental 
kidnapping to be considered the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, 
and state courts must implement legislative intent in their double jeopardy 
analyses.18  Third, ensuring that the state may prosecute parental kidnappers 
 
11  748 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). 
12  Id. at 307–08; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-45 (West 2010). 
13  Carlson, 748 S.E.2d at 306. 
14  GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-45. 
15  See id. 
16  Dixon v. United States, 509 U.S. 688, 701–02 (1993) (reaffirming the validity of the 
Blockburger same elements test); see also United States v. Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299, 304 
(1932); see, e.g., State v. Kimbler, 509 N.E.2d 99, 104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (holding that 
criminal contempt and parental kidnapping should not be considered the same crime under 
the Blockburger same elements test). 
17  Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495 (1974); Kimbler, 509 N.E.2d at 103–04. 
18  William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 411, 
448 (1993). 
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under its criminal statutes results in more consistent sentencing.19  Finally, 
considering the significant harms that parental kidnapping inflicts on both 
the custodial parent and the child, a finding of criminal contempt alone does 
not adequately punish parental kidnappers.20 Therefore, courts should hold 
that the double jeopardy rule does not protect a parental kidnapper from 
punishment under both criminal contempt of court and state criminal 
statutes. 
First, Part I of this Comment discusses the history of judicial oversight 
in child custody cases and introducing the problem of parental kidnapping.  
Next, Part II identifies five methods by which the legal system combats 
parental kidnapping: federal legislation, state criminal statutes, judicial 
enforcement of child custody orders, tort law, and court-sponsored 
mediation.  Next, Part III outlines the history of the double jeopardy rule 
and explains how different courts have applied it to criminal contempt of 
court and parental kidnapping.  Finally, Part IV explains the four 
aforementioned reasons why courts should hold parental kidnappers 
responsible under state criminal laws, regardless of any prior criminal 
contempt sanctions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The history of judicial oversight in American child custody cases 
begins in the early twentieth century.  Over time, child custody 
jurisprudence evolved from the traditional paternal preference to the “best 
interests of the child” standard used by courts today.21  In light of the 
 
19  Some states, such as Massachusetts and Nebraska, have no limits on criminal 
contempt penalties.  Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345, 
407 n.379 (2000).  In contrast, state criminal statutes provide guidelines as to how parental 
kidnappers should be sentenced.  See generally NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation, 
infra note 60.   
20  See Geoffrey Greif, Parental child abduction and its impact, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, 
(Nov. 13, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/buddy-system/201011/parental-
child-abduction-and-its-impact (“[R]eactions to abduction include: nightmares, fears of 
doors and windows, bedwetting (depending on age), fear of authority and strangers, anger at 
abductor and left-behind parent, depression, anxiety, and school and peer problems. 
Problems for many adults persist into their 20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s”); Administrative Office of 
the Courts, Effects of Parental Abduction in Child Custody Cases, WASHINGTON COURTS, 
https://www.courts.wa.gov/newsInfo/content/pdf/HarmfulEffectsOfParentalAbduction.pdf 
[hereinafter WASHINGTON COURTS] (“If the child is very young when abducted and is 
returned as an older child, the child may suffer serious negative emotional effects because 
the child feels as if he or she is returned to a stranger, and therefore the return to the parent 
who was originally left behind seems like an abduction itself.”). 
21  See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. (Aug. 2, 1973); J. Herbie 
DiFonzo, From the Rule of One to Shared Parenting: Custody Presumptions in Law and 
Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 215–16 (2014) (describing modern courts’ tendencies to 
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court’s decision-making role in child custody disputes, there are various 
motivations for parental kidnapping, as well as different factors that 
contributed to the rise of parental kidnapping. 
A. JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES: HISTORY AND 
MODERN APPLICATION 
In the United States, natural parents have a “fundamental liberty 
interest . . . in the care, custody, and management of their child.”22  As 
Justice Blackmun wrote in Santosky v. Kramer, “Even when blood 
relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the 
irretrievable destruction of their family life.”23 
There are four classes of proceedings in United States law that affect 
the custody of a child: (1) divorce and dissolution of a marriage, (2) 
guardianship law, (3) juvenile court and neglect laws, and (4) laws relating 
to the termination of parental authority for adoption.24  This Comment 
addresses the first class of proceedings, after the divorce and dissolution of 
a marriage. 
Prior to a divorce, parenting activity is not subject to detailed 
regulation by the state.25  However, after a divorce, the court system has the 
authority to regulate parents through child custody and visitation orders.26  
These judicial orders dictate which parent is the primary guardian, how 
much time each parent can spend with the child, and where the children will 
live.27  In the eyes of the law, child custody orders serve the important 
purpose of protecting the established relationships between children and 
both of their parents, in light of the changed family circumstances that 
result from divorce.28 
Under traditional English common law—which serves as the 
foundation of American law in this area—fathers had patria potestas, or 
parental power, over their children, whom the fathers viewed as chattel or 
servants.29  However, in the early twentieth century, both British and 
 
encourage joint legal custody or shared parenting, as long as it is in the best interests of the 
child). 
22  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
23  Id. 
24  Christopher L. Blakesley, Child Custody—Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY L. 
J. 291, 297 (1986). 
25  Mahoney, supra note 1, at 836. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child 
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American courts shifted their custody supposition: under the new “Tender 
Years doctrine,” courts presumed that mothers should have custody of their 
young children, unless the father could show that the mother was “unfit.”30  
The tender years doctrine suggested that mothers are “softer and more 
natural nurturers” than fathers, as well as “biologically better designed” for 
childrearing.31 
In 1970, American child custody law evolved to a “neutral best 
interests of the child” standard in deciding custody, as recommended by the 
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA).32  Most states passed statutes 
listing factors that a judge should consider when determining the child’s 
best interests.33  The UMDA also set forth a general presumption of 
visitation rights for the other parent.34  Accordingly, most states passed laws 
protecting the access rights of the noncustodial parent;35 generally, a court 
would only deny visitation rights if the judge believed that contact with the 
other parent would endanger the child.36  Finally, in the 1980s, courts began 
to encourage joint legal custody or shared parenting, rather than naming one 
parent as primary custodian, as long as it was in the best interests of the 
child.37  This policy remains in effect today.38 
 
Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J. L. FAM. STUD. 337, 345–46 (2007). 
30  Laura Beleau, Farewell to Heart Balm Doctrines and the Tender Years Presumption, 
Hello to the Genderless Family, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 365, 379–81 (2012) 
(describing the tender years doctrine as the “legal presumption that the mother is the best 
custodian for infants and young children”); Kohm, supra note 29, at 346; June Carbone & 
Leslie J. Harris, Family Law Armageddon: The Story of Morgan v. Foretich, in FAMILY LAW 
STORIES 139 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008). 
31  Beleau, supra note 30, at 380. 
32  UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. (Aug. 2, 1973) [hereinafter 
UMDA] (“The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the 
child.  The court shall consider all relevant factors including: (1) the wishes of the child’s 
parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian; (3) the 
interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings, and any 
other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; (4) the child’s adjustment 
to his home, school, and community; and (5) the mental and physical health of all 
individuals involved.”). 
33  Carbone & Harris, supra note 30, at 141. 
34  See UMDA § 407A(a), supra note 32. 
35  Thomas R. Young, Legal Rights of Children, 1 LEG. RTS. CHILD. REV. 2D § 3:2 (3d 
ed.) (2015) (“As a general rule, it is recognized that a noncustodial separated parent has a 
liberty interest in communicating with and visiting his or her child where custody of the 
child has been granted to the State or to the other custodial parent.”). 
36  Kohm, supra note 29, at 359. 
37  DiFonzo, supra note 21, at 215–16. 
38  Id.; see also Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. 
L. J. 455, 455 n.2 (1984) (stating that today, approximately 30 states have joint custody laws 
and many other states have considered similar legislation). 
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B. THE PROBLEM OF PARENTAL KIDNAPPING 
Because state courts have the power to issue child custody orders, 
divorced parent may not be able to go wherever they want, whenever they 
want, with their child.  As a result, some divorced parents may decide to 
violate the child custody order, and in some situations their decisions 
amount to child kidnapping.39 In the typical parental kidnapping case, the 
noncustodial parent, often with the aid of relatives, withholds the child from 
the custodial parent and attempts to conceal the child’s location in violation 
of a court-ordered custody decree.40  Kidnapping statutes generally require 
proof of intent to detain or conceal the child from the custodial parent.41 
In 1979, Senator Alan Cranston estimated that 25,000 parental 
kidnappings occurred each year.42  Congress responded in 1984 by passing 
the Missing Children’s Assistance Act, which directed the U.S. Department 
of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) 
to establish a national resource center to provide additional research on the 
topic.43  Since the Act’s passage, the OJJDP has conducted two major 
studies: The National Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway, 
and Thrownaway Children (NISMART) in 1988 and the follow up, 
nicknamed NISMART-2, in 1999.44  NISMART-2 predicted that, in the 
twenty years since Senator Cranston’s statement before Congress’s 
Subcommittee on Child and Human Development, parental kidnapping had 
risen almost tenfold to an estimated 203,900 children per year.45 
 
39  William B. Johnson, Liability of legal or natural parent, or one who aids and abets, 
for damages resulting from abduction of own child, 49 A.L.R.4th 7 (1986). 
40  Id.  
41  Id.; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §750.350a (West 2014) (setting out a specific 
intent element for parental kidnapping: “the intent to detain or conceal the child from any 
other parent or legal guardian of the child who has custody or visitation rights pursuant to a 
lawful court order at the time of the taking or retention”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4501(2) 
(West 2016) (setting out the intent element of kidnapping in the second degree as “intent to 
keep or conceal [a child] from its custodial parent, guardian, or other person having lawful 
care or control thereof”); ANN. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (West 2011) (setting out the intent 
element as “intent to detain or conceal that child from a lawful custodian”). 
42  Sue T. Bentch, Comment, Court-Sponsored Custody Mediation to Prevent Parental 
Kidnapping: A Disarmament Proposal, 18 ST. MARY’S L.J. 361, 361 n.1 (1986) (citing 
Proposed Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: Hearings on S. 105 Before the 
Subcomm. on Child and Human Dev. of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) (statement of Senator Alan Cranston)). 
43  Missing Children’s Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title IV of the Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (1974); Adrienne L. Fernandes-Alcantra, 
Missing and Exploited Children: Background, Policies, and Issues, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE 3, (April 29, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34050.pdf. 
44  Fernandes-Alcantra, supra note 43, at 4. 
45  Id. 
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Some scholars explain the modern rise of parental kidnapping through 
social causes.46  First, high divorce rates have increased the number of 
children who are potential victims of parental kidnapping.47  Disgruntled 
divorcees may use their children as “ammunition” to retaliate against their 
ex-spouses.48  Alternately, one parent may seek to move to another state 
after the divorce—perhaps to live closer to relatives or in the event of a 
remarriage; however, the other parent may successfully prevent such a 
move by arguing that relocation would violate the child custody order or 
make the current arrangement unworkable.49 If a parent’s efforts to move 
out of state after a divorce are thwarted, he may resort to parental 
kidnapping.50 
Second, parental kidnapping stories attract publicity, which may 
ironically encourage more parents to use such a strategy to maintain or 
regain custody and control over their children.51  Third, the ease of 
interstate transportation allows for greater mobility for parental kidnappers 
to move their children out of the other parent’s reach.52 Finally, some 
fathers feel that the legal system is biased against them in determining 
custody and visitation rights, such that they will not be granted custody or 
favorable visitation rights.53 These fathers may resort to parental 
 
46  Bentch, supra note 42, at 364. 
47  Id.; see also National Vital Statistics System, National Marriage and Divorce Rate 
Trends, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/
marriage_divorce_tables.htm (stating that in each year from 2000 through 2014, over two 
million married couples got divorced in the United States). 
48  Id. 
49  See Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional Perspective, 
34 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L. 1, 2–3 (1996) (“Many women, as they contemplate 
interstate relocation, find their former husbands seek to prevent such a move. Moreover, the 
former husbands are frequently successful, particularly in the trial courts.”); Linda D. Elrod, 
A Move in the Right Direction? Best Interests of the Child Emerging as the Standard for 
Relocation Cases, 3 J. OF CHILD CUSTODY 29, 44 (2006). 
50  Elrod, supra note 49, at 44–45 (“A parent who ‘thinks’ that the environment in 
another location may be better for their health may find the court rejecting the relocation for 
that reason.  Courts have not been sympathetic to parents who unilaterally act in taking the 
children from the jurisdiction without the court or the other parent’s permission.”). 
51  Bentch, supra note 42, at 364–65; see also Jeremy D. Morley, Preventing 
International Child Abduction in Divorce, 28 A.B.A. SOLO, SMALL FIRM & GEN. PRACTICE 
DIVISION 3, at 5 (April/May 2011) (observing that child custody judges are “aware of the 
firestorm of publicity” elicited by parental kidnapping cases).  
52  Richard A. Campbell, Note, Transition: The Tort of Custodial Interference—Toward 
a More Complete Remedy to Parental Kidnappings, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 229, 233 (1983). 
53  Joseph R. Hillebrand, Note, Parental Kidnapping and the Tort of Custodial 
Interference: Not in a Child’s Best Interests, 25 IND. L. REV. 893, 895 n.16 (“The 
noncustodial father feels alienated from his children and angry at the legal system, which 
places strict limits on the amount of time noncustodial parents are allowed to see their 
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kidnapping, believing it maximizes the amount of time they can spend with 
their children. 
Other scholars attribute the rise in parental kidnapping to early 
jurisdictional problems in child custody matters.54  Prior to the 1960s, little 
federal regulation existed to govern child custody jurisdiction.55  As a 
result, state courts were often aggressive in asserting jurisdiction in child 
custody cases, even doing so when they knew that another state’s courts had 
already asserted jurisdiction in the same matter.56  As a result, a parent 
could move his child into another jurisdiction and ask the court of the new 
state to modify the child custody order.57  Fortunately, after Congress 
enacted the PKPA in 1982, state courts could no longer grant such requests 
from parents engaging in parental kidnapping because the PKPA created a 
federal obligation that all states defer to the prior custody proceedings and 
decisions of their sister states.58  Regardless of its causes, parental 
kidnapping presented a problem for courts and legislatures in the second 
half of the twentieth century and remains a problem today.59 
II. CURRENT METHODS OF COMBATING PARENTAL KIDNAPPING 
The legal system currently uses five methods to combat parental 
kidnapping in the United States: federal legislation (namely, the UCCJA 
and the PKPA), state criminal laws, enforcement of child custody orders, 
tort law, and court-sponsored child custody mediation.60 
 
children and punishes them for falling behind on support payments”) (citing JOHN E. GILL, 
STOLEN CHILDREN 37 (1981)); see also HEALTHRESEARCHFUNDING.ORG, supra note 4.  
54  See, e.g., Amy M. Palesch, A Small Amount of Change for the Good of Children: 
Replacing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act with the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2007); 
Nancy S. Erickson, The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: How can Non-Marital 
Children Be Protected?, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 529, 530 (1988). 
55  Erickson, supra note 54, at 530. 
56  Id.; Blakesley, supra note 24, at 293.   
57  Erickson, supra note 54, at 530. 
58  Roger M. Baron, Federal Preemption in the Resolution of Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Disputes, 45 ARK. L. REV. 885, 890 (1993). 
59  See Bentch, supra note 42, at 361; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3 
(estimating in 2010 that more than 200,000 children are victims of parental kidnapping each 
year).  
60  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 4607 (1984). See generally David Carl Minneman, 
Recognition and enforcement of out-of-state custody decree under § 13 of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a), 40 A.L.R.5th 227 (1996); National District Attorneys Association, 
National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse & National District Attorneys Association 
Parental Kidnapping Compilation, NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, (June 
2010), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Parental%20Kidnapping%20June%202010.pdf [hereinafter 
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A. FEDERAL LEGISLATION – THE UCCJA AND THE PKPA 
In the early 1960s, the increase in the numbers of divorces and the 
consequent child custody disputes brought the problem of parental 
kidnapping to the forefront of national attention.61  At that time, the 
Supreme Court of the United States had not settled the question of whether 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution applied to child custody 
orders, so state courts continued to modify their sister states’ child custody 
decrees.62 
In 1968, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws crafted the UCCJA.63  The UCCJA laid out a scheme in which one 
court, the “custody court,” would assume full responsibility for the custody 
of a particular child, to the exclusion of courts in other states.64 
The custody court would be chosen based on which state has access to 
the most relevant information about the child and family.65 
 If the child no longer had ties to the state of the custody court—for 
example, because the family moved to another state—a new custody court 
would be selected.66 By 1979, thirty-nine states had adopted the UCCJA.67  
Unfortunately, many cases decided after the UCCJA noted its failure to 
prevent interstate conflicts due to a lack of uniformity.68 
 A non-conforming state that had not adopted the UCCJA or had 
adopted it with modifications could still serve as an attractive “haven” to 
the losing party in custody decisions.69  Furthermore, the UCCJA’s 
dependence on judicial interpretation led to inconsistent application: state 
 
NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation]; Mahoney, supra note 1, at 836; George L. Blum, 
Recognition and Application of the Common Law Action for Tortious Interference with 
Parental Rights, 103 A.L.R.6th 461 (2015).  
61  Sheldon A. Vincenti, The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: Time to Reassess, 33 
IDAHO L. REV. 351, 362–63 (1997). 
62  Office of Justice Programs, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, The 
Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2 (Dec. 
2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/189181.pdf.; Erickson, supra note 54, at 530. 
63  Vincenti, supra note 61, at 365. 
64  Id. at 365–66 (quoting Bridget M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 
VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1218 (1969)). 
65  Vincenti, supra note 61, at 365. 
66  Id. at 366 (quoting Bridget M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 
1207, 1218 (1969)). 
67  Id. at 368. 
68  Minneman, supra note 60, at 227. 
69  Baron, supra note 58, at 890 (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 
(1988)). 
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courts often interpreted the flexible provisions of the UCCJA in their own 
favor to claim jurisdiction.70 
Still, the widespread acceptance of the UCCJA garnered the attention 
of the media and, subsequently, Congress.71  In response to interstate 
disputes caused by the UCCJA, Congress passed the PKPA in 1980.72  As 
an addendum to the full faith and credit statute of the United States Code, 
the PKPA created a federal obligation that all states defer to the prior 
custody proceedings and decisions of their sister states.73  Thus, although 
the UCCJA could result in more than one state claiming to meet the 
conditions set forth for the custody court, the PKPA eliminated the 
possibility of concurrent jurisdiction.74 The PKPA required that each state 
“enforce according to its terms” any custody decree that satisfies the 
jurisdictional criteria of the Act and refrain from exercising jurisdiction if 
an action was already pending in another qualified forum.75 
The original PKPA also proposed making parental kidnapping a 
federal crime.76  However, Congress ultimately decided not to make 
interstate parental kidnapping a federal crime.77  Although the proposal was 
supported by the American Bar Association (a non-profit organization 
called Children’s Rights, Inc.) and some individual parents, the measure 
was strongly opposed by the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation as “unduly harsh and a misuse of scarce resources.”78  
Instead, the final version of the PKPA simply held that interstate parental 
kidnappers could be punished under the Fugitive Felon Act79 as long as 
 
70  Baron, supra note 58, at 890; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 2. 
71  Vincenti, supra note 61, at 368 (citing Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Dev. of the Comm. on Labor and 
Human Resources, 96th Cong. 150–59, 244–64 (1979)). 
72  See Blakesley, supra note 24, at 355; Linda M. Demelis, Note, Interstate Child 
Custody and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: The Continuing Search for a National 
Standard, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1330, 1329-30 (1994); Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, 
and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 813 (1995)).  
73  Baron, supra note 58, at 891–92. 
74  Vincenti, supra note 61, at 356.   
75  Id. at 370 (quoting 28 U.S.C § 1738A(a) (1995)).  
76  Id. at 368. 
77  Anne B. Goldstein, The Tragedy of the Interstate Child: A Critical Reexamination of 
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, 25 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 27 (1992). Notably, Congress did make international parental 
kidnapping a crime under the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act (IPKCA).  18 
U.S.C. § 1204 (1998).  Under the IPKCA, an international parental kidnapper can be 
punished with fine and/or imprisonment of up to three years.  Id. 
78  Goldstein, supra note 77, at 27. 
79  18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982).  The penalty for violating the Fugitive Felon Act is a fine 
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parental kidnapping was a felony in the state where the child was stolen.80 
Since the PKPA was passed, scholars have disagreed about the 
relationship between the PKPA and the UCCJA.81  Professor Sheldon 
Vincenti of the University of Idaho College of Law, for example, argues 
that the PKPA was intended to eradicate the so-called “haven state”—any 
state that did not adopt the UCCJA—where parental kidnappers could seek 
refuge.82  Professor Vincenti points to a statement by Senator Malcolm 
Wallop of Wyoming, the author and sponsor of the PKPA, in which he 
voiced his hopes that by requiring every state to “enforce the decrees of 
sister states that have adopted the Uniform Act,” the PKPA would motivate 
every state to adopt the UCCJA.83  Senator Wallop wrote, “Assuming all 
fifty states and the District of Columbia do adopt the [UCCJA, the PKPA] 
will retain its usefulness in those cases in which a court might ignore the 
state law but would be hard pressed to ignore both state and federal law.”84 
The Senator further noted that universal adoption of the UCCJA would 
render the PKPA largely unnecessary and perhaps even mandate its 
repeal.85 Thus, based on Senator Wallop’s statements, Professor Vincenti 
claims that Congress intended for the UCCJA and PKPA to work 
together.86 
In contrast, Christopher Blakesley, a law professor at the University of 
Nevada Las Vegas William S. Boyd School of Law, argues that in 
adjudicating child custody jurisdictional disputes, courts must ask two 
questions: (1) whether the court has jurisdiction, and (2) whether to exercise 
it.87  According to Blakesley, the PKPA and the UCCJA work together to 
guide courts in answering the first question, while the UCCJA provides the 
answer to the second question.88  However, Blakesley also notes that the 
PKPA does not prohibit a state from enforcing a custody decree that is not 
enforceable under the federal act, if the decree is enforceable under the 
 
and/or imprisonment, as well as extradition to the state from which he or she fled.  See id.  
80  Id. 
81  See Blakesley, supra note 23, at 355; Demelis, supra note 72, at 1330; Wasserman, 
supra note 23, at 866–67. 
82  Vincenti, supra note 61, at 369. 
83  Id.  
84  Id. (quoting Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979, S. 105: Addendum to Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary and the 
Subcomm. on Child and Human Dev. of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 86th 
Cong. 96–54). 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Blakesley, supra note 24, at 355. 
88  Id. 
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UCCJA.89  Thus, where the PKPA and UCCJA disagree, the court has 
discretion to issue a finding consistent with the “underlying statutory 
UCCJA policy to discourage child snatching, avoid jurisdictional 
competition, and create greater stability,” and is not restricted by the 
provisions of the PKPA.90  Ultimately, the ambiguity surrounding the 
relationship between the PKPA and the UCCJA illustrates that courts must 
take additional steps to consistently and adequately punish and deter 
parental kidnapping. 
In the same vein, some scholars argue that the PKPA and UCCJA are 
ineffective at combating parental kidnapping.91  Professor Rhonda 
Wasserman of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law criticizes the 
PKPA, arguing that it gives the custody court an unconstitutional power to 
bind parents solely based on subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of 
whether the court has personal jurisdiction.92  Similarly, Linda Demelis, 
attorney and editor of TheCorporateCounsel.net, points out that state courts 
often disagree in their interpretations of the PKPA’s jurisdictional rules, just 
as they had differed in interpreting the UCCJA’s rules.93  For example, the 
PKPA provides little guidance for how courts should decide a child’s 
“home state” in joint custody situations; after all, a child in joint custody 
may have two established homes in two different states.94  Due to the 
inconsistencies in applying the PKPA, Demelis suggests that the best way 
to establish a uniform national standard is for individual state legislatures to 
expressly adopt child-based jurisdiction, where the custody court is 
determined based on where the child spends the majority of the year.95 
Ultimately, it is unlikely that the UCCJA and PKPA alone can 
effectively combat parental kidnapping without additional support from 
state legislatures and courts. 
 
89  Id.  
90  Neger v. Neger, 459 A.2d 628, 639 (N.J. 1983). 
91  See, e.g., Demelis, supra note 72, at 1329–31; Wasserman, supra note 72, at 813. 
92  Wasserman, supra note 72, at 867–68 (explaining that the PKPA gives a state court 
the power to adjudicate child custody disputes as long as it is the child’s “home state” or had 
been the child’s home state within six months before commencement of the child custody 
proceedings, regardless of whether the child or either parent is still domiciled there or 
whether the state court has in personam jurisdiction over the parents). 
93  Demelis, supra note 72, at 1330–31. 
94  Id. at 1343–44. 
95  Id. at 1344–45. 
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B. STATE LEGISLATION – THE CRIME OF PARENTAL KIDNAPPING OR 
CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE 
Beyond the UCCJA and PKPA, state legislatures have attempted to 
combat parental kidnapping through criminal statutes, which label such 
conduct as a misdemeanor or a felony.96  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
declared that child custody cases are considered a matter of state law.97  
Accordingly, states have the power to decide whether and how to punish 
parents who violate child custody orders through parental kidnapping.98 
Historically, parents could not be criminally prosecuted for kidnapping 
their own children.99  Federal kidnapping laws granted parental immunity; 
for example, the Lindbergh Act, enacted in 1932, exemplified the notion 
that parents have the sovereign right to do whatever they think is best for 
the child.100  Similarly, before the passage of the PKPA and the UCCJA, 
several state kidnapping laws had instituted parental immunity.101  
However, prompted in part by the PKPA, all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia have amended their kidnapping laws: some revised their original 
laws to expressly include parents, others passed statutes specifically 
criminalizing parental kidnapping.102  Furthermore, perhaps because of the 
PKPA’s Fugitive Felon provision, many states categorized parental 
kidnapping as a felony.103  However, parental kidnapping criminal statutes 
 
96  See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.10 (West 2010) (“An offense under this section 
is a state jail felony.”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5 (2010) (“A person convicted of child 
abduction under this Section is guilty of a Class 4 felony.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
750.350(a) (2010) (“A parent who violates [this section] is guilty of a felony . . . .”). 
97  Baron, supra note 58, at 885–86. 
98  Id. 
99  See State v. Benner, 385 A.2d 48, 49 (Me. 1978). 
100  Bentch, supra note 42, at 365 n.20 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982) (punishing 
“whoever unlawfully . . . kidnaps, abducts, or carries away . . . any person, except in the case 
of a minor by the parent thereof”)). 
101  Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 17-A, § 301 (1983) (providing a defense to 
kidnapping where the victim of abduction is the child of the actor); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 
20.03 (b)(2) (1974) (providing an affirmative defense to kidnapping where the victim of 
abduction is related to the actor)). 
102  Bentch, supra note 42, at 378. 
103  Id. at 378–79. The Fugitive Felon provision of the PKPA refers to the Fugitive Felon 
Act, a federal statute that prohibits individuals who have committed a felony under state law 
from interstate or international travel.  18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1996).  Individuals found to be 
fugitive felons are subject to federal prosecution and penalties.  1780. Fugitive Felon Act—
18 U.S.C. 1073, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, https://
www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1780-fugitive-felon-act-18-usc-1073. The 
primary purpose of the Fugitive Felon Act is “to permit the Federal government to assist in 
the location and apprehension of fugitives from state justice.”  Id. 
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still vary widely from state to state.104 
C. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF CUSTODY ORDERS 
State courts also have the power to combat parental kidnapping by 
holding parents in contempt of court for violating child custody orders.105 
As products of the court, child custody orders are mandatory.106  In order to 
enforce child custody orders, courts use the remedies of civil and criminal 
contempt.107  Contempt is defined as the “misbehavior of any person in [the 
court’s] presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of 
justice” or “disobedience or resistance to [the court’s] lawful writ, process, 
order, rule, decree, or command.”108  The distinction between civil and 
criminal contempt is significant because if the contempt is considered civil 
and the relief remedial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply.109 
Civil and criminal contempt are significantly different.  In Shillitani v. 
United States,110 the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the test for determining 
whether contempt is civil or criminal in nature: “It is not the fact of 
punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to 
distinguish civil from criminal contempt. . . . The test may be stated as: 
what does the court primarily seek to accomplish by imposing [the] 
sentence?”111  If the purpose of the sentence is to coerce, the proceeding is 
civil; if the purpose of the sentence is to punish, the court has imposed 
 
104  See generally NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation, supra note 60. See also 
J.E.K., Offense of abduction or kidnapping as affected by defendant’s belief in legality of his 
act, 114 A.L.R. 870 (1938). 
105  Mahoney, supra note 1, at 854 (“Under the laws of most states, the range of judicial 
remedies for the violation of custody and visitation orders is wide.  First, contempt remedies 
become available whenever parental noncompliance is viewed as the violation of a coercive 
or injunctive order of the court.”).   
106  Id. 
107  Id. 
108  Paul A. Grote, Purging Contempt: Eliminating the Distinction Between Civil and 
Criminal Contempt, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 401 
(2006)). 
109  See State v. Hope, 449 So. 2d 633, 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (“At the onset, we 
must determine whether the contempt proceeding against defendant was civil or criminal.  If 
the proceeding was civil in nature, trial of defendant on the kidnapping charge would not 
constitute double jeopardy.”); see also Robert B. Adrine & Alexandra M. Ruden, § 13:13. 
Court enforcement of civil protection orders—Double jeopardy concerns, in OH. DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE L. § 13:13 (December 2014). 
110  384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). 
111  Id. at 369–70 (quoting Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 
(1911)). 
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criminal contempt.112  In United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell,113 the 
Court further elaborated that the line between civil and criminal contempt 
sanctions is drawn “not from the subjective intent of a State’s laws and its 
courts, but from an examination of the character of the relief itself.”114  The 
Court explained: 
The paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction . . . involves confining a 
contemnor indefinitely until he complies with an affirmative command such as [a 
court order] . . . . Imprisonment for a fixed term similarly is coercive when the 
contemnor is given the option of earlier release if he complies. . . . By contrast, a fixed 
sentence of imprisonment is punitive and criminal if it is imposed retrospectively for a 
‘completed act of disobedience,’ such that the contemnor cannot avoid or abbreviate 
the confinement through later compliance.115 
Previously, in United States v. Halper,116 the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that a civil suit brought by the government could constitute a second 
punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause: “the labels 
‘criminal’ and ‘civil’ are not of paramount importance . . . a civil as well as 
a criminal sanction constitutes punishment.”117  However, in Hudson v. 
United States,118 the Court disavowed its previous holding in Halper and 
instead declared that double jeopardy only protects against the imposition 
of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense.119 
In summary, state courts can prevent parental kidnapping and enforce 
child custody decrees by holding parents in civil or criminal contempt of 
court, depending on whether the court’s goal is to coerce the parent into 
compliance with the custody order or to punish the parent for a prior 
violation.120  However, if the state also determines that the crime of parental 
kidnapping has the same elements as criminal contempt of court, then a 
parental kidnapper who has already been prosecuted for criminal contempt 
cannot be subsequently charged with the crime of parental kidnapping. 
 
112  Id. at 370. 
113  512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994). 
114  Id. (quoting Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 633 (1988)). 
115  Id. at 828–29 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 498).  
116  490 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1989). 
117  Id. at 447–48.  The Court thus concluded that “the Government may not criminally 
prosecute a defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon him, and then bring a separate civil 
action based on the same conduct and receive a judgment that is not rationally related to the 
goal of making the Government whole.”  Id. at 451.   
118  522 U.S. 93, 100–02 (1997). 
119  Ultimately, in Hudson, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a return to the previously 
articulated double jeopardy standard from United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).  Id. 
at 103. 
120  Grote, supra note 108, at 1248. 
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D. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR PARENTAL KIDNAPPING UNDER TORT LAW 
Certain states allow parents to sue each other for parental kidnapping 
through the tort law system.121  Although the PKPA provides a federal 
solution to state jurisdictional disputes, it does not provide a federal remedy 
through civil litigation.122  In Thompson v. Thompson,123 two private parties 
tried to sue in federal court to determine which of their conflicting state 
custody decrees was valid.124  The U.S. Supreme Court held that although 
the PKPA furnishes a rule of decision for courts to use in adjudicating 
custody disputes, it does not create an entirely new cause of action in 
federal courts.125 
However, some states recognize a private cause of action for parents 
who have been victimized by parental kidnapping, issuing damages for 
“tortious interference with the custodial parent-child relationship.”126  The 
second Restatement of Torts codifies this cause of action in § 700, Causing 
Minor Child to Leave or not to Return Home: “One who, with knowledge 
that the parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a 
minor child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return 
to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability to the parent.”127  
Several states, such as Wisconsin and Louisiana, have adopted the tort of 
unlawful intentional interference with custody of a parent entitled to that 
custody, as laid out in § 700.128 
In another example, the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized a 
private cause of action for parents for loss of custody in Wyatt v. 
McDermott.129  In Wyatt, the biological father—who was not alleged to be 
an unfit parent—sought legal recourse against the child’s mother for 
 
121  See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 496–97 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying 
Wisconsin state law); Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So. 2d 200, 202 (La. Ct. App.1979) (citing 
14 LSA-R.S. § 45). 
122  See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988). 
123  484 U.S. 174 (1988). 
124  Id. at 177–78. 
125  Id. at 187 (“The context in which the PKPA was enacted—the existence of 
jurisdictional deadlocks among the States in custody cases and a nationwide problem of 
interstate parental kidnaping—suggests that Congress’ principal aim was to extend the 
requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody determinations, and not to create 
an entirely new cause of action False Congress did not intend the federal courts to play the 
enforcement role.”). 
126  Blum, supra note 60, at 461; see, e.g., Loeffler, 694 F.2d at 496–97; Terebelo, 373 
So. 2d at 202. 
127  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977). 
128  Loeffler, 694 F.2d at 496–97; Terebelo, 373 So. 2d at 202 (citing 14 LSA-R.S. § 45). 
129  725 S.E.2d 555, 562 (Va. 2012). 
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intentionally preventing him from exercising his parental rights.130  The 
Virginia court ruled in favor of the father and established the tort of 
interference with parental rights, requiring the plaintiff to prove the 
following elements: 
(1) the complaining parent has a right to establish or maintain a parental or custodial 
relationship with his/her minor child; (2) a party outside of the relationship . . . 
intentionally interfered . . . by removing or detaining the child from returning to the 
complaining parent, without the parent’s consent, or by otherwise preventing the 
complaining parent from exercising his/her parental or custodial rights; (3) the outside 
party’s intentional interference caused harm to the complaining parent’s . . . 
relationship with his/her child; and (4) damages resulted from such interference.131 
The court further held that denying the father a private right of action for 
parental kidnapping would be “both astonishing and profoundly 
disturbing.”132  Accordingly, parents in Virginia may sue under the tort of 
interference with parental rights to seek legal redress.133 
However, there are also states that do not provide a civil remedy for 
parents victimized by parental kidnapping.134  For example, the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota refused to create such a tort in Larson v. Dunn.135  The 
Larson court expressed its concern that allowing parents to bring civil suits 
against each other for parental kidnapping would not serve the best interests 
of the children, as it would only intensify intra-family conflict after divorce: 
 
130  Id. at 564. 
131  Id. at 562 (quoting Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 765–66 (W. Va. 1998)). 
132  Id. at 564.  
133  Maryland, Iowa, and Florida courts also allow parents to recover under the tort of 
interference with parental custody rights. See, e.g., Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1047 
(Fla. 1999) (holding that parental kidnapping causes “real harm that the tort [for intentional 
interference with the custodial parent-child relationship] is designed to redress, including 
substantial expenses incurred by a parent in having the child returned”); Murphy v. I.S.K. 
Con. Of New England, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 352 (Mass. 1991) (recognizing the tort of 
intentional interference with the parent child relationship as a “contemporary expression 
encompassing actions for abduction, enticement, harboring, and secreting of a minor child 
from the parent having legal custody”); Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Iowa 1983) 
(“A tort suit will be more likely to effect a speedy return of the child; it will result in better 
cooperation by potential third-party defendants seeking to avoid the suit; potential punitive 
damages will serve as an additional deterrent; and increased knowledge of the child’s 
whereabouts will result through the broad scope of civil-case discovery.”). 
134  See Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1990); Hoblyn v. Johnson, 55 P.3d 
1219, 1225 (Wyo. 2002) (holding that the state of Wyoming does not recognize the tort of 
intentional interference with parental rights); Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431, 432–33 (Vt. 
1978) (declining to recognize a separate tort for parental kidnapping and instead suggesting 
that parents seek recovery under the tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress). 
135  460 N.W.2d at 46. 
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Evidence is piling up that children can be devastated by divorce, and their continuing 
development can be detrimentally affected by subsequent events.  For the good of our 
children, the law should seek to promote such harmony as is possible in families 
fractured by the dissolution process. . . . The interest in compensation should not 
outweigh the effects of bitter accusations on young children. . . . [This tort] would 
place innocent children in the middle of a vigorous, probably vicious, lawsuit between 
their parents.136 
The court also added that creating a new tort would not actually deter 
parental kidnapping because “[f]amily ties are normally stronger than the 
fear of money damages.”137  Finally, the court concluded that a parent who 
suffered from an especially egregious case of parental kidnapping should 
instead seek recovery through the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, rather than the tort of custodial interference.138  Ultimately, the 
Minnesota court concluded that the proper remedy for violation of a court 
order “lies in contempt and other such sanctions; not in providing the other 
party with compensation.”139 
The Minnesota, Wyoming, and Vermont supreme courts agree that 
recognizing a tort action for parental kidnapping does not provide a solution 
to parental kidnapping.140  As the Larson court explained, creating a new 
tort does not deter any parent who would gladly pay monetary damages in 
order to maintain exclusive custody of the child.141  Ultimately, creating a 
new tort for custodial interference provides an inadequate deterrent for 
parental kidnappers.142 
E. COURT-SPONSORED CUSTODY MEDIATION 
Finally, courts may refer divorced parents to child-custody mediation 
as a preventative measure in combating parental kidnapping.143 
In an attempt to reduce child custody-related conflict between parents 
after divorce, California courts use mandatory court-sponsored custody 
 
136  Id. at 45–46. 
137  Id. at 46. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. 
140  Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 46; Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431, 432–33 (Vt. 1978); 
Hoblyn v. Johnson, 55 P.3d 1219, 1225 (Wyo. 2002). 
141  Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 46–47. 
142  Whether or not a state decides to recognize the tort of custodial interference does not 
have any impact on double jeopardy analysis.  See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 
451 (1989). (“The protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by litigation 
between private parties.”). 
143  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (requiring that all contested custody issues be mediated). 
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mediation.144  In 1984, the California legislature passed a statute requiring 
each superior court to supply a mediator that is professionally qualified; for 
example, the mediator can be a staff member of a mental health agency, 
probation department, or conciliation court.145  Furthermore, the California 
system requires courts to separate the child custody mediation from the 
parents’ divorce hearing, recognizing that although the parents’ relationship 
with each other may be irreconcilable, they can still work together as co-
parents for their child’s best interests.146  Other states, such as Alaska, Iowa, 
and Montana provide similar mediation or counseling before custody 
determinations; however, the mediation generally occurs at the discretion of 
the court.147 
The California child custody mediation system provides three benefits 
for post-divorce families.148  First, successful child custody mediation is 
less expensive than litigation.149  Second, mediation is more likely to 
salvage the relationship between the parents by avoiding “the appearance of 
leaving one parent the winner and the other the loser,” as the process strives 
to produce an outcome that satisfies both parties.150  Third, by minimizing 
the chance for future hostilities between parents, a successful mediation 
promotes the mental and emotional health of the child.151  Thus, proponents 
of court-sponsored mediation argue that it deters parental kidnapping “by 
reducing the number of its potential victims: children whose parents either 
anticipate bitter custody litigation or who refuse to abide by the result of 
such a battle.”152 
 
144  Id.; see Guardianship of MS.W., 136 Cal. App. 3d 708, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) 
(explaining that the purpose of the mediation statute’s mandatory language is to reduce 
conflict between parents). 
145  Id.; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 
146  See id.; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4609 (West 1985). 
147  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.080 (1983) (holding that “the court may order the 
parties to submit to mediation”); IOWA. CODE ANN. § 598.41(2)(d) (West 1985) (holding that 
“unless the court determines that direct physical harm or significant emotional harm to the 
child, other children, or a parent is likely to result, the court may require the parties to 
participate in custody mediation to determine whether joint custody is in the best interest of 
the child”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-3-124 (1985) (giving courts the power to appoint a 
“conciliation counselor” who is qualified by training and experience in personal counseling 
to hold “conciliation conferences” with parties to settle custody disputes). 
148  Bentch, supra note 42, at 389–90. 
149  Id. at 389. 
150  Id. at 389–90. 
151  Id. at 390. 
152  Id. at 391.  Since adopting court-sponsored mediation, Los Angeles county courts 
have experienced a 75% reduction in the number of custody cases adjudicated.  Id. at 388 
n.153. 
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Although mediation sounds like an ideal solution, it may prove 
unworkable in some custody disputes and invariably lead to litigation.153  
Some ex-spouses may be unable to successfully mediate due to 
vindictiveness and deceitfulness.154  Similarly, feelings of mistrust and 
hostility between former couples may be too strong for a productive 
mediation session, despite a good faith attempt to work out their issues.155  
Ultimately, although mandatory custody mediation may be helpful in 
preventing parental kidnapping in some cases, it is an incomplete solution.  
In situations where mediation is insufficient and a parent resorts to 
kidnapping, criminal contempt sanctions and state criminal statutes are still 
necessary to punish and deter parental kidnapping. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE 
This section lays out the history of the double jeopardy rule in 
American jurisprudence, followed by an analysis of how the double 
jeopardy rule affects the interaction between criminal contempt sanctions 
and prosecutions for parental kidnapping. 
A. HISTORY OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE 
The double jeopardy rule finds its roots in the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.  The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no 
person shall be “subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb.”156  Under the double jeopardy rule, an individual is protected 
from successive prosecutions and punishments for the same crime.157 
The history of double jeopardy jurisprudence can be traced back to the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s establishment of the “same elements” test in 
Blockburger v. United States.158  The Blockburger test holds that where “the 
 
153  Id. (citing King, Handling Custody and Visitation Disputes Under the New 
Mandatory Mediation Law, 2 CAL. LAW. 40, 41 (1982) (concluding that mediation does not 
resolve all custody disputes)). 
154  Id. at 391 (citing JOAN BLADES, FAMILY MEDIATION: COOPERATIVE DIVORCE 
SETTLEMENT 4 (1985)). 
155  Id. (citing DONALD T. SAPOSNEK, MEDIATING CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES 217 (1983)). 
156  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
157  North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 729 (1969) (“By forbidding that no person 
shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, the safeguard 
of the Fifth Amendment against double punishment guarded against the repetition of history 
by punishing a man for an offense when he had already suffered the punishment for it”) 
(quoting Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 276 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
158  284 U.S. 299; see 1932 Harvard Law Review Association, Double Jeopardy—
Substantive Criminal Charges Following a Finding of Criminal Contempt, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 144, 144 (1993). 
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same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory 
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two 
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact 
which the other does not.”159  Subsequently, in Grady v. Corbin,160 the 
Court held that in addition to passing the “same elements” test of 
Blockburger, the subsequent prosecutions must also satisfy the “same 
conduct” test: the government must attempt to prove conduct that 
constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been 
prosecuted.161 
However, a mere three years later in United States v. Dixon,162 the U.S. 
Supreme Court overruled the Grady “same conduct” test and announced a 
return to the Blockburger “same elements” test.163  In Dixon, the Court held 
that double jeopardy prevented the state from prosecuting the defendant for 
assaulting his wife because he had already been held in criminal contempt 
of court for violating a civil protection order prohibiting simple assault.164  
However, the Court also held that several other counts brought by the state 
against the defendant were not barred under the double jeopardy rule, 
because the other counts required different elements of proof.165  For 
example, “assault with intent to kill” requires proof of specific intent to kill, 
whereas the crime of simple assault does not.166  Thus, the Court held that 
the defendant could still be prosecuted for assault with intent to kill without 
violating the double jeopardy rule.167  Today, the Blockburger same 
elements test still governs the application of the double jeopardy rule.168 
B. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT AND 
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING 
Domestic violence activists celebrated the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Dixon for refusing to protect violators of civil protection orders 
 
159  Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 
(1911)). 
160  495 U.S. 508 (1990). 
161  Id. at 522.  
162  509 U.S. 688 (1993). 
163  Id. at 701–04 (determining that the “subsequent prosecution for assault fails the 
Blockburger test, and is barred” under the double jeopardy rule). 
164  Id. at 700. 
165  Id. at 700–01. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. at 703. 
168  Boyd v. Boughton, 798 F.3d 490, 500–01 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying Dixon and the 
Blockburger “same elements” test to a defendant’s double jeopardy claim). 
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from subsequent criminal prosecution for assault or domestic violence.169  
However, the Court has yet to address whether Dixon similarly applies to 
child custody orders and criminal prosecution for parental kidnapping. 
Recall that the double jeopardy rule prohibits multiple prosecutions for 
the same criminal offense.170  Both criminal contempt of court and parental 
kidnapping are crimes in all fifty states.171  A child custody order that may 
be enforced by criminal contempt and criminal prosecution raises a 
constitutional question: when a parent is guilty of criminal contempt of 
court for violating a child custody order, does the Double Jeopardy Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment prohibit the state from subsequently prosecuting 
that parent for parental kidnapping?172 
Some states, such as Illinois, have applied the double jeopardy rule to 
protect a criminal contemnor from subsequent prosecution for parental 
kidnapping.173  For example, in In re Marriage of D’Attomo, the court held 
that violating a child custody order constitutes the same offense as child 
abduction under the Blockburger same elements test: “[S]ince the child 
abduction statute is defined in such a way as to criminalize the violation of 
a custody order by the removal or concealment of a child, such offense is 
the same as the indirect criminal contempt charge in the pending case.”174  
As applied to the defendant’s specific situation, the court held that the 
defendant’s violation of the custody order stemmed from the same act of 
removing the child from the jurisdiction, such that he only committed “one, 
continuing act of contempt and not several, distinct acts.”175 
Other states like Ohio have rejected defendants’ double jeopardy 
arguments.176  For example, in State v. Kimbler,177 the Ohio appellate court 
applied the Blockburger same elements test and concluded that the double 
jeopardy rule should not apply.178 
The Kimbler court first explained that under the Ohio parental 
 
169  See Jennifer Black, The Double Jeopardy Dilemma in Combating Domestic 
Violence: A Solution in United States v. Dixon, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 911, 926 (1995). 
170  North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 733 (1969). 
171  Bentch, supra note 42, at 378; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968). 
172  See Zitter, supra note 8, at 950. 
173  See In re Marriage of D’Attomo, 570 N.E.2d 796, 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. 
Rodriguez, 514 N.E.2d 1033, 1037–38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); People v. Howard, 686 P.2d 644, 
649 (Cal. 1984); State v. Hope, 449 So.2d 633, 636 (La. Ct. App. 1984). 
174  In re Marriage of D’Attomo, 570 N.E.2d at 802. 
175  Id. 
176
 Eva J. Klain, Judges’ Guide to Criminal Parental Kidnapping Cases, 48 JUV. & FAM. 
CT. J. 49, 2-15 (1997). 
177  509 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). 
178  Id. at 104. 
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kidnapping statute, the prosecution need only show that the defendant, “by 
any means and with purpose to withhold a minor from the legal custody of 
his parent,” removed the child “from the place where he is found.”179  The 
prosecution does not need to prove the violation of a court order for a 
conviction under state parental kidnapping laws, only the existence of a 
court order: 
“While [proof of a violation of a court order] might tend to prove the purpose of the 
taking of the children so as to supply that element of the crime of child stealing, in 
connection with that offense it is unnecessary to prove violation of a court order.  
Rather, the existence of the court order will be relevant only to prove who had legal 
custody of the child.”180 
In contrast, the court held that the prosecution did not need to prove 
any of the elements of child stealing for a charge of criminal contempt for 
violating a court order involving custody.181  Under Ohio’s criminal 
contempt of court statute, the court may punish any person “guilty of 
misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct 
the administration of justice.”182  Ohio’s criminal contempt statute further 
provides a list of examples of acts that may be punished for contempt, 
including “disobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ, process, order, 
rule, judgment, or command of a court.”183  In the event of a parental 
kidnapping, the defendant must violate a court-issued custody order to be 
held in criminal contempt of court.184  Accordingly, the Kimbler court 
concluded: 
[A]lthough the same conduct may result both in criminal contempt and a violation of 
[the state criminal statute], they do not constitute the same offense for double jeopardy 
purposes since conviction for violation of the statute requires proof of facts not 
 
179  Id. at 103–04 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.04 (West 2015)). 
180  Id. at 104. 
181  Id. at 103–04.  Ohio’s statute criminalizing parental kidnapping reads: “No person, 
by any means and with purpose to withhold a minor from the legal custody of his parent, 
guardian, or custodian, shall remove the minor from the place where he is found.” OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2905.04 (West 2015). The court concluded, “None of the elements of this 
offense need be proved in connection with a charge of criminal contempt for violating a 
court order involving custody, such as herein involved.”  Kimbler, 509 N.E.2d at 104. The 
Ohio state legislature later repealed § 2905.04; however, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.23 
(West 2016) criminalizes interference with custody as a misdemeanor or a felony, depending 
on whether the child is removed from the state and whether the child suffers physical harm 
as a result of the kidnapping: “No person, knowing the person is without privilege to do so or 
being reckless in that regard, shall entice, take, keep, or harbor . . . from the parent, guardian, 
or custodian of . . . [a] child under the age of eighteen.”  Id. at § 2919.23(A)(1). 
182  Id. at 103 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.01 (West 2015)). 
183  Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.01 (West 2015)). 
184  Id. 
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required to be proven for a conviction of criminal contempt and conviction of criminal 
contempt requires proof of facts not required to prove a violation of the statute.185 
Therefore, the court held that parental kidnapping and criminal contempt of 
court do not share the same elements and therefore should not be considered 
the same crime for double jeopardy purposes. 
Furthermore, the court pointed out that criminalizing contempt of court 
serves a different purpose than criminalizing parental kidnapping: 
“the criminal statute involved . . . is not concerned with preventing or punishing 
obstructions of the administration of justice but, instead, is designed to prevent child 
stealing, that is, the taking of a child from the person having legal custody of the 
child, whether taken by a noncustodial parent or a third person.”186 
Therefore, the court held that the defendant’s prior conviction of criminal 
contempt does not bar the state’s ability to prosecute him for kidnapping.187 
For the reasons outlined below, courts should follow Ohio’s example 
rather than Illinois’s, and hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not 
protect criminal contemnors from subsequent criminal prosecution under 
state parental kidnapping laws. 
IV. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE SHOULD NOT PROTECT CRIMINAL 
CONTEMNORS FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR PARENTAL KIDNAPPING 
The double jeopardy rule should not protect criminal contemnors from 
subsequent criminal prosecution for parental kidnapping under applicable 
state court laws for three reasons.  First, criminal contempt of court does not 
contain the same elements as parental kidnapping, so the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not apply.  Second, allowing a conviction for criminal 
contempt of court to prevent prosecution under state criminal laws can lead 
to inconsistent results.  Finally, sanctions for criminal contempt of court do 
not adequately punish parental kidnappers, considering the serious and 
harmful consequences of the crime.  Therefore, courts should allow the 
state to prosecute defendants for parental kidnapping, regardless of any 
prior proceedings for criminal contempt of court. 
A. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SAME 
ELEMENTS AS PARENTAL KIDNAPPING 
Criminal contempt of court for violating a child custody order does not 
contain the same elements as child kidnapping for the purposes of double 
jeopardy. 
 
185  Id. 
186  Id. 
187  Id. at 104. 
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As mentioned above, the combination of parental kidnapping and 
criminal contempt fails the Blockburger same elements test.  Criminal 
contempt of court contains an element requiring the existence of a court 
order.  The contempt offense disrespects state family courts by disobeying 
their decrees and interfering with their ability to regulate parenting behavior 
in the child’s best interests.  At common law, criminal contempt was used 
by courts to sanction conduct that “interfered with the orderly 
administration of judicial proceedings.”188  This common law power is now 
codified in the United States Code as the “power to punish by fine or 
imprisonment, or both, at its discretion . . . [d]isobedience or resistance to 
its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.189  Accordingly, a 
prosecution for criminal contempt requires the state to prove that the parent 
violated a court order. 
In contrast, the parental kidnapping offense does not always require 
proof of a court-issued custody order as an element of the crime.190  
Parental kidnapping punishes any actor who kidnaps a child and deprives a 
parent of her legal right to custody of her child.191  Criminal statutes on 
kidnapping make it unlawful for a person to (1) take a child (2) with the 
intent to detain or conceal the child from her lawful custodian.192  In 
 
188  United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 694 (1992). 
189  18 U.S.C. § 401 (2002).  While contempt powers under § 401 also authorizes the 
court to punish “[m]isbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct 
the administration of justice” and “[m]isbehavior of any of its officers in their official 
transactions,” parental kidnapping does not fall under either of these categories.  Instead, 
criminal contempt sanctions against parental kidnappers fall under the court’s power to 
punish “disobedience.”  For examples of misbehavior that obstructs the administration of 
justice, see, e.g., United States v. Landes, 97 F.2d 378, 379–81 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding that 
an attorney who refused to take his seat although ordered to do so by judge was properly 
found guilty of contempt of court); see also United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 820, 820 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that an attorney who attempted three times to ask question of witness 
that judge had prohibited was properly found guilty of contempt of court). 
190  See, e.g., Strother v. State, 1 P.2d 214, 217–18 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); State v. 
Donahue, 680 P.2d 191, 192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).  
191  Klain, supra note 176, at 1-2. 
192  Johnson, supra note 2, at 823 (“Criminal statutes on kidnapping, or related crimes, 
generally make it unlawful for a person to take a child with the intent to detain and conceal 
such child from a parent or other lawful custodian.”); see, e.g., State v. Kracker, 599 P.2d 
250, 252 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming a conviction for child stealing where mother had 
admitted she had taken and concealed son from father who had legal custody of the child by 
decree of court in divorce proceedings); People v. Hyatt, 18 Cal. App. 3d 618, 622–23 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1971) (affirming a conviction for child stealing where father used his visitation 
privileges to take children from mother in whose charge they had been placed by 
interlocutory decree in divorce proceedings and left the state with the children, not to be 
found for over two years); People v. Harrison, 402 N.E.2d 822, 824 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) 
(affirming a conviction for child abduction where father picked up children while exercising 
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contrast, the court may hold a parent in criminal contempt as long as they 
disobeyed a court order, even if he had no such intent to detain and conceal 
the child.193  Likewise, a parent may be charged with parental kidnapping 
even without the existence of a court order.194 
For example, in Strother v. State,195 the Court of Appeals of Alaska 
explained that to prove the crime of custodial interference, the State had to 
establish three elements: (1) that the defendant—here, the child’s father—
took, enticed, or kept the child from a lawful custodian, (2) that the 
defendant intended to hold the child for a protracted period of time, and (3) 
that the father knew he had no legal right to take the child.196  The court 
then explained even in the absence of a custody order, the defendant could 
be convicted for custodial interference because his actions of “secretly 
removing and hiding his daughter, keeping the child from his wife and 
refusing to disclose the child’s location, epitomize[d] the conduct that the 
custodial interference statutes prohibit.”197  Based on the defendant’s 
actions, his knowledge that he had no legal right to engage in these actions, 
and his intent to hold the child for a protracted period, the Strother court 
held that “persons of ordinary understanding would have no trouble 
concluding that the [defendant] has committed the crime of custodial 
interference.”198 
The Arizona Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion in State v. 
Donahue,199 holding that even in the absence of a court decree defining the 
respective custody rights of the two parents, the state can still convict a 
defendant for custodial interference.200  A Delaware court has similarly held 
 
visitation rights then took the children away in the nighttime to another state without 
disclosing his destination to mother, not to be found for over one month). 
193 State v. Kimbler, 509 N.E.2d 99, 103–04 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). 
194  Id.; see also Strother, 1 P.2d at 217–18.  
195  1 P.2d 214 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
196  Id. at 217. 
197  Id. at 226. 
198  Id. 
199  680 P.2d 191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). 
200  Id. at 193 (finding the defendant, an unwed father who had abducted the child from 
the mother, guilty of custodial interference even though no official custody order existed 
between the unwed father and mother of the child because “his right was at most a right to 
co-equal custody with the child’s natural mother [and he] did not have the right to custody of 
the child to the exclusion of the mother”); see also State v. Wood, 8 P.3d 1189, 1191–92 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that father who took son to another state without mother’s 
knowledge or consent could be charged with custodial interference, even though mother had 
not yet filed her petition for dissolution of marriage and for temporary custody of son prior 
to father taking son out of state). 
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in State v. Todd201 that a child’s natural father could be convicted of 
custodial interference, even though no valid custody order existed.202  
Ultimately, because the state must prove different elements to prosecute a 
parent for criminal contempt of court compared to parental kidnapping, the 
double jeopardy rule does not apply under the Blockburger same elements 
test. 
B. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM 
THE CRIME OF PARENTAL KIDNAPPING 
In Albernaz v. United States,203 the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the 
Blockburger same elements test is a “rule of statutory construction, and 
because it serves as a means of discerning congressional purpose the rule 
should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of 
contrary legislative intent.”204  In addition to containing different elements, 
criminal contempt of court contains other significant differences compared 
to the crime of parental kidnapping.  Accordingly, if a state court is 
convinced that the legislature intended for criminal contempt and parental 
kidnapping to constitute two different offenses to which double jeopardy 
should not apply, the court may authorize multiple punishment for a single 
act.205  The numerous and significant differences between criminal 
contempt and parental kidnapping demonstrate that many state legislatures 
may have intended to punish parental kidnappers for both contempt and the 
crime of parental kidnapping.  Accordingly, state courts should not apply 
the Double Jeopardy Clause to protect criminal contemnors from a 
subsequent prosecution for criminal contempt. 
First, criminalizing contempt of court serves a fundamentally different 
purpose than criminalizing parental kidnapping.  Although both criminal 
contempt and ordinary criminal laws serve to protect the institutions of 
government and the enforcement of governmental mandates, contempt is a 
unique crime because the judge is so personally affected.206  As the U.S. 
 
201  509 A.2d 1112 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986). 
202  Id. at 1113–14 (finding the defendant, an unwed father who had abducted the child 
from the mother, guilty of custodial interference because Delaware law delineates rights and 
responsibilities between natural parents even where no valid custody order exists). 
203  450 U.S. 333 (1981). 
204  Id. at 340. 
205  McAninch, supra note 18, at 448 (“The Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than 
prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature 
intended. The Blockburger test is a guide, and no more than that, to ascertaining whether the 
legislature intended to authorize multiple punishment for a single act.”). 
206  Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1968) (expressing that contempt “strikes at 
the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge’s temperament.”). 
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Supreme Court held in Bloom v. Illinois, “[e]ven when the contempt is not a 
direct insult to the court or the judge, it frequently represents a rejection of 
judicial authority, or an interference with the judicial process or with the 
duties of officers of the court.”207 
In contrast, legislatures criminalize parental kidnapping in order to 
punish and deter such conduct, which in turn protects potential child 
victims and keeps families intact.208  For example, California titled its 2002 
statute criminalizing parental kidnapping the Synclair-Cannon Act after its 
author, Larry Synclair.209  Synclair, whose son was a victim of parental 
kidnapping on three separate occasions, drafted the bill to alert California 
courts to the “red flags of child abduction” and protect the “left-behind 
parent’s fundamental and constitutional right to the care, custody and 
control of the child.”210  When the court protects a contemnor from 
prosecution for child kidnapping, the judicial system sends the wrong 
message that parental kidnapping is nothing more than a crime of disrespect 
against the court.  Because criminal contempt of court serves a different 
purpose than the crime of parental kidnapping, the two are not the same 
crime. 
In addition, criminal contempt of court is categorized differently than 
parental kidnapping.  Criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401 is a sui 
generis offense, not classifiable as a felony or a misdemeanor for 
sentencing purposes.211  As the Eleventh Circuit held in Cohn, this 
separateness “appropriately reflects the differences between criminal 
 
207  Id. at 202. 
208  See State Dep’t of Human Res. ex rel Johnson v. Bail, 938 P.2d 209, 213 (Or. 1997) 
(“Punishment of a parent’s past misconduct and deterrence of potential misconduct by others 
in the future are functions of the criminal law, which prohibits custodial interference.”); 
Hicks v. State, 12 S.W.2d 385, 386 (Tenn. 1928) (“[Tennessee’s statute criminalizing 
parental kidnapping] was intended to protect parental and other lawful custody of children 
against the greed and malice of the kidnapper.”); Foster-Zahid v. Virginia, 477 S.E.2d 759, 
762 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (“The underlying policy for [Virginia’s statute criminalizing 
parental kidnapping] is to deter, if not prevent, child snatching.”); Patricia M. Hoff, Parental 
Kidnapping: Prevention and Remedies, A.B.A. CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, (Dec. 
2000), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/child/PublicDocuments/
pkprevrem.authcheckdam.pdf (“All fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Congress have 
enacted civil and criminal laws to address parental kidnapping.”). 
209  SYNCLAIR-CANNON CHILD ABDUCTION PREVENTION ACT, 2002 CAL. STATS. 856 
(2002). 
210  The Synclair-Cannon Child Abduction Prevention Act of 2002, LARRY SYNCLAIR JR. 
ABDUCTED TO RUSSIA OVER TEN YEARS AGO, http://abducted-larrysynclairjr.weebly.com/
synclair-cannon-act.html.  
211  United States v. Cohn, 586 F.3d 844, 848–49 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Cheff v. 
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966)). 
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contempt and the traditional crimes. . . . ”212  In contrast, state criminal 
statutes punish parental kidnapping as a misdemeanor or a felony.213  Most 
states, including Texas, Illinois, and Michigan, immediately label such 
criminal conduct as a felony,214 while other states, such as Alaska and 
Nebraska, punish parental kidnapping as a misdemeanor.215  There are also 
some states, such as Missouri and Pennsylvania, where parental kidnapping 
within the state is a misdemeanor, while removal of the child out of state 
constitutes a felony.216  Regardless of the state, the crime of parental 
kidnapping is treated as either a misdemeanor or a felony, unlike criminal 
contempt.217 
Furthermore, the procedure of prosecuting criminal contempt is 
different than that of prosecuting parental kidnapping.  For example, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that criminal contempt does not 
always require the right to a jury trial.  In Taylor v. Hayes,218 the Court held 
that where the contemnor’s punishment amounts to less than six months of 
imprisonment, he has only been convicted of “petty contempt” and has no 
right to a jury trial.219  The Court further stated that courts are permitted, 
after conviction, to reduce a contemnor’s sentence to less than six months to 
avoid a jury trial: “a State may choose to try any contempt without a jury if 
it determines not to impose a sentence longer than six months.”220  In 
contrast, the jury plays an integral role in the prosecution of child 
kidnapping in several states, such as Oklahoma and Nevada.221 
 
212  Id. at 849. 
213  See generally NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation, supra note 60. 
214  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.10 (West 2010) (“An offense under this section is a 
state jail felony”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5 (2010) (“A person convicted of child 
abduction under this Section is guilty of a Class 4 felony”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
750.350(a) (West 2004) (“A parent who violates [this section] is guilty of a felony.”). See 
generally NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation, supra note 60. 
215  ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.330 (West 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-316 (West 
2010).  Alaska state law punishes kidnapping less severely where the actor is the parent of 
the victim, compared to where the actor is unrelated to the victim.  Although the former is 
only a class A misdemeanor, the latter is a class C felony.  Compare ALASKA STAT. § 
11.41.330 with ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.320. 
216  MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.150 (West 2010); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2904 
(West 2010). 
217  See generally NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation, supra note 60. 
218  418 U.S. 488 (1974). 
219  Id. at 495; see also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970); Frank v. United 
States, 395 U.S. 147, 148–50 (1969). 
220  Taylor, 418 U.S at 496. 
221  See OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21 § 891 (West 2010) (“Except for persons sentenced to 
life or life without parole, any person sentenced to imprisonment for two (2) years or more 
for a violation of this section [titled Child Stealing] . . . shall be required to serve a term of 
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Ultimately, the many significant differences between criminal 
contempt of court and parental kidnapping suggest that state legislatures did 
not intend for the Double Jeopardy Clause to protect criminal contemnors 
from subsequent prosecution under state parental kidnapping statutes.  
Therefore, state courts should uphold the intent of the legislature in treating 
criminal contempt and parental kidnapping as separate offenses for double 
jeopardy purposes. 
C. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT DOES NOT CONSISTENTLY 
PUNISH PARENTAL KIDNAPPING 
Courts should hold that the double jeopardy rule does apply to protect 
criminal contemnors from subsequent prosecution for parental kidnapping 
because sanctions for criminal contempt do not consistently punish parental 
kidnapping.  Holding a parent in criminal contempt fails to communicate 
the seriousness of his crime; instead, state criminal statutes, which classify 
parental kidnapping as a misdemeanor or even a felony, serve as a more 
effective punishment and deterrent.  Furthermore, although sanctions for 
criminal contempt of court remain unregulated and virtually limitless, state 
criminal statutes provide guidelines to ensure consistent and adequate 
punishments.222  Ultimately, if criminal contemnors are protected by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause from subsequent prosecution under state parental 
kidnapping statutes, they will not receive an adequate punishment. 
Little regulation exists to ensure consistent sanctions for criminal 
contempt.  The court has a great deal of discretion when determining 
sanctions for criminal contempt, based on how much the judge believes the 
parent should be punished for his or her act of disrespect.223  Although the 
typical sanction for contempt is fine or jail time, alternative sanctions 
include suspending the violating parent’s driver’s license, ordering that 
makeup parenting time be provided for the non-violating parent, or 
modifying the custody order.224  Furthermore, there is often no minimum or 
maximum limit on the sanctions a judge can impose for contempt of 
 
post-imprisonment supervision False The jury shall be advised that the mandatory post-
imprisonment supervision shall be in addition to the actual imprisonment”); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 200.350 (West 2009) (“Upon the trial for violation of [this statute outlawing child 
kidnapping the consent thereto of the person kidnaped or confined shall not be a defense 
unless it appears satisfactorily to the jury that such person was above the age of 18 years and 
that the person’s consent was not extorted by threats, duress or fraud.”). 
222  See generally NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation, supra note 60. 
223  See United States v. Cohn, 586 F.3d 844, 849 (11th Cir. 2009) (describing “the scope 
of § 401 and the wide range of sentences that may be imposed for its violation”). 
224  Mahoney, supra note 1, at 856–57.  The list of remedies usually does not include an 
outright denial of custody rights to the violating parent.  Id. 
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court.225  As a result, the potential for abuse of the contempt power is 
readily apparent.  Justice Black criticizes the contempt power as too 
discretionary in Green v. United States: 
[Contempt is] an anomaly in the law . . . perhaps, nearest akin to the despotic power 
of any power existing under our form of government . . . a drastic and pervasive mode 
of administering criminal justice usurping our regular constitutional methods of trying 
those charged with offenses against society.226 
In contrast, state statutes criminalizing parental kidnapping provide 
sentencing guidelines to ensure consistency, predictability, and adequacy in 
punishments across all courts within the same jurisdiction.227  For example, 
Maryland’s statute sets specific tiers of punishment, based on the gravity of 
the parental kidnapping incident.228  If the child is out of the custody of the 
lawful custodian for thirty or fewer days but not removed from the state, the 
punishment is a felony conviction and a fine not exceeding $1,000 or 
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.229  If the child is out of the 
custody of the lawful custodian for more than thirty days but not removed 
from the state, the punishment is a felony conviction and a fine not 
exceeding $2,500 or imprisonment not exceeding three years, or both.230  
However, if the child is taken out of the state in a parental kidnapping 
incident, the punishment is a felony conviction and a fine not exceeding 
$5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both.231  Unlike the 
wide variety of sanctions a judge could impose as punishment for criminal 
contempt,232 state criminal laws provide guidance to ensure consistent 
punishments for parental kidnapping. 
Furthermore, several states severely restrict the sanctions that a judge 
may impose for criminal contempt so that criminal contemnors always 
 
225  Grote, supra note 108, at 1248 (citing Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the 
Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 
VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026–28 (1993) (describing the power of contempt as both “vast and 
unlimited” and any judge using the contempt power “suffer[s] from an obvious and 
ineradicable conflict of interest”)).  For example, in Illinois, there is no maximum penalty for 
criminal contempt of court.  Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968) (citing People v. 
Stollar, 201 N.E.2d 97, 99 (1964)). 
226  356 U.S. 165, 193–94 (1957) (citing State ex rel. Ashbaugh v. Circuit Court, 72 
N.W. 193, 194–95) (Black, J., dissenting). 
227  See generally NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation, supra note 60. 
228  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-307 (West 2010). 
229  Id. 
230  Id. 
231  Id. 
232  Some states, such as Massachusetts and Nebraska, have no limits on criminal 
contempt penalties.  Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345, 
407 at n.379 (2000).  
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receive a lesser punishment than they would if they were prosecuted for the 
crime of parental kidnapping.233  For example, in Arkansas, criminal 
contempt is a class C misdemeanor, which has a maximum sanction of 30 
days imprisonment.234  However, if a parent is prosecuted under Arkansas 
criminal laws for parental kidnapping, he will be charged with a class A 
misdemeanor, which is punishable by up to one year in prison.235  Similarly, 
Pennsylvania’s statutes limit sanctions for criminal contempt of court to a 
fine of up to $100 or imprisonment for up to thirty days.236  In contrast, a 
parent convicted of parental kidnapping in Pennsylvania faces 
imprisonment for up to seven years.237  Finally, under California statutes, 
the maximum penalty for criminal contempt is five days of imprisonment 
and a $1,000 fine, but the maximum penalty for parental kidnapping is four 
years in prison.238 
Fierro v. State239 provides another example of the disparity between a 
sentence for criminal contempt of court and a sentence under a state 
parental kidnapping law.  In Fierro, although the parents’ divorce 
proceedings were still pending, the court had issued a temporary custody 
order providing for shared parental custody and set forth a schedule for the 
parents to follow.240  The temporary order also prohibited the parents from 
taking the child outside of the Second Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida 
without obtaining the written consent of the other party.241  However, the 
father violated the temporary order by failing to return the three-year-old 
son to the mother as required by the order.242  Fourteen months later, the 
child was found living with the father in South Carolina.243  The court held 
the father in criminal contempt and sentenced him to six months in jail.244  
 
233  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16–10–108 (West 1987) (limiting sanctions for criminal 
contempt of court to a $50 fine or imprisonment for no more than ten days); CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 1218(a) (West 1982) (limiting sanctions for criminal contempt of court to a $1,000 
fine or imprisonment for no more than five days, or both); 42 PA. STAT AND CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 4137(c) (West 1995) (limiting sanctions for criminal contempt of court to a $100 fine 
or imprisonment for no more than thirty days, or both). 
234  ARK. CODE ANN. § 16–10–108 (West 1987).  
235  ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–26–502(a) (West 2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–4–401(a)(3) 
(West 2016). 
236  42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 4137(c) (West 2016). 
237  18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 1103(3) (West 2016). 
238  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218(a) (West 2007); CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (West 4). 
239  653 So. 2d 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
240  Id. at 448–49. 
241  Id. 
242  Id. 
243  Id. 
244  Id. 
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Subsequently, the state of Florida attempted to charge the father for 
violating section 787.04 of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits the 
concealing or removing of a minor child contrary to a court order.245  Even 
though the jury found the father guilty and sentenced him to five years of 
probation, the Florida appellate court found that double jeopardy protected 
the father from sanctions under the state criminal statute because he had 
already served a sentence for criminal contempt.246 
Carlson similarly demonstrates the potential disparity between 
sanctions for criminal contempt and the sentencing guidelines of the 
applicable state criminal statute.247 In Carlson, the judge held a parent in 
criminal contempt for violation of a child custody order and decided that 
the sanction would be incarceration for five hours, “until 5:00 p.m. that 
day.”248  Compare this punishment with the one suggested by Georgia’s 
state criminal statute outlawing parental kidnapping, which holds that a 
person convicted of the misdemeanor of interference with custody shall be 
fined not less than $200.00 and not more than $500.00, or shall be 
imprisoned for not less than one month and not more than five months, or 
both.249  Thus, another parent in Georgia who effectively commits the same 
crime as Carlson could face a much harsher punishment: if the government 
prosecuted him under Georgia’s criminal statute, the result would be at least 
a $200 fine or a month of imprisonment. 
These examples demonstrate that applying the double jeopardy rule to 
parental kidnapping cases can lead to senselessly disparate results.  
Although the wide discretion judges have in punishing criminal contempt 
may allow harsher punishments for parental kidnapping, the reduced 
discretion of state parental kidnapping statutes fosters consistency in 
sentencing, which leads to greater deterrence.250  Therefore, courts should 
hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect criminal contemnors 
from subsequent prosecution under state criminal statutes for parental 
kidnapping. 
 
245  Id. at 447–48 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 787.04 (West 2016)). 
246  Id. at 447. 
247  748 S.E.2d 304, 304 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). 
248  Id. at 306. 
249  GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-45(2)(A) (West 2016). 
250  See Mirko Bagaric, Consistency and Fairness in Sentencing—The Splendor of Fixed 
Penalties, 2 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000) (explaining the empirical flaws in the argument 
that disproportionate punishments reduce the crime rate through deterrence). 
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D. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT DOES NOT ADEQUATELY PUNISH 
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING 
Finally, courts should not allow the double jeopardy rule to protect 
criminal contemnors from subsequent prosecution for parental kidnapping 
because contempt is not an adequate punishment considering the gravity of 
their crime.  Parental kidnapping leads to significant harms for both the 
custodial parent and the child, and such conduct should be punished 
accordingly.251 
First, parental kidnapping results in harm to the child.  The child 
suffers emotional and psychological damage from being suddenly uprooted 
and forcibly taken from their custodial parent.252  This damage may increase 
after the child is found and uprooted once again, in order to be returned to 
the original custodial parent.253  In addition, the kidnapping parent may 
force the child to continually move from place to place to evade the other 
parent or law enforcement officials looking for the missing child.254  As a 
result, many kidnapped children fail to receive adequate education or 
adequate medical care and live in substandard housing.255 
Furthermore, 75% of victims of parental kidnapping are six years old 
or younger.256  Most child development experts agree that personality is 
formed prior to the age of six.257  Therefore, the abduction of a young child 
has a significant influence on whom he or she becomes.258  In an interview 
with the International Centre for Family Law, Policy, and Practice, one 
victim of parental kidnapping said, “I feel that the core of me has been 
shattered . . . I have an internal conflict between my natural . . . personality 
and the personality that has been formed as a consequence of these 
experiences.”259  Other victims expressed feelings of isolation and low self-
 
251  See Greif, supra note 20 (“[R]eactions to abduction include: nightmares, fears of 
doors and windows, bedwetting (depending on age), fear of authority and strangers, anger at 
abductor and left-behind parent, depression, anxiety, and school and peer problems. 
Problems for many adults persist into their 20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s.”). 
252  Id. 
253  WASHINGTON COURTS, supra note 20 (“If the child is very young when abducted and 
is returned as an older child, the child may suffer serious negative emotional effects because 
the child feels as if he or she is returned to a stranger, and therefore the return to the parent 
who was originally left behind seems like an abduction itself.”). 
254  Georgia K. Hilgeman, Impact of Family Child Abduction, CALIFORNIA CHILD 
ABDUCTION TASK FORCE, (Aug. 27, 2001), http://www.childabductions.org/impact2.html. 
255  WASHINGTON COURTS, supra note 20. 
256  Hilgeman, supra note 254. 
257  Id. 
258  Id. 
259  Marilyn Freeman, Parental Child Abduction: The Long-Term Effects, 
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worth, problems with attachment, security, and mistrust, and lack of 
emotion.260  Finally, abducted children may be told by the kidnapping 
parent that the left-behind parent did not want them or that the left-behind 
parent is dead, resulting in feelings of loss and grief, as well as long-term 
emotional scars.261 
Also, during a parental kidnapping incident, the custodial parent 
suffers a violation of her legal right to custody and the resulting absence of 
the child.262  The custodial parent’s anguish over her missing child can lead 
to long-term emotional and physical problems.263  Also, custodial parents 
spend an average of $20,000 trying to locate and regain custody of their 
kidnapped children.264  Furthermore, along with the stress of worrying 
about their missing child, many parents must deal with the possibility that 
their missing child may never be located.265  At least 20% of children 
kidnapped by the other parent are never found.266  Thus, the custodial parent 
may suffer emotional, physical, and financial harm as a result of the other 
parent’s choice to kidnap his child.267 
Considering the severe and numerous harms experienced by parents 
and children as a result of parental kidnapping, parents guilty of such 
conduct should not be able to escape criminal liability under state laws 
simply because a judge has sanctioned them with criminal contempt of 
court. The district court in United States v. Mirra268 warned against this 
very outcome, when it declined to apply the double jeopardy rule to protect 
a criminal contemnor.269  In Mirra, the court allowed the state to prosecute a 
defendant for criminal assault even though he had already been held in 
contempt of court for throwing a chair at the Assistant United States 
 
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR FAMILY LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE, (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://childcentre.info/public/PROTECT/Research_report_web_1.12.14_R.pdf. 
260  Id. 
261  Hilgeman, supra note 254; WASHINGTON COURTS, supra note 20. 
262  Mahoney, supra note 1, at 836. 
263  Psychological Impact of Abduction, NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE 
SERVICE, https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/190074/page6.html.  Studies showed that the 
left-behind parent harbored feelings of loss, rage, loneliness, and fear, and d impaired sleep, 
loss of appetite, or severe depression.  Furthermore, these negative feelings and effects did 
not automatically cease upon the return of the abducted child; on the contrary, many parents 
expressed that their psychological distress actually increased after reuniting with their child, 
due to the stress of reunion and lingering concerns about re-abduction.  Id. 
264  Campbell, supra note 52, at 232. 
265  Id. 
266  Id. 
267  Id. 
268  220 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
269  Id. at 366–67. 
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Attorney during trial.270  The court reasoned: 
Let us consider by way of illustration the consequences of upholding Mirra’s claim in 
the context of an extreme but not wholly improbable case that could have arisen after, 
and out of, Mirra’s contempt conviction. Assume that Mirra’s projectile had received 
more accurate a propulsion and had scored on its intended target—the Assistant 
United States Attorney. And assume further the grisly and morbid fact that the 
Assistant United States Attorney had sustained an injury which ultimately proved 
fatal. To sustain Mirra’s [double jeopardy] claim would, in effect, grant a summary 
contemnor immunity from a homicide prosecution—an unconscionable result.271 
In the same way, to sustain a double jeopardy claim to protect a parental 
kidnapper simply because a judge has already held her in criminal contempt 
leads to inadequate punishment and an unconscionable result. 
Furthermore, contempt sanctions are often relatively mild.272  In light 
of the enduring emotional and psychological damage that parental 
kidnapping causes, a maximum punishment of five days imprisonment or a 
fine of $50 seems hardly sufficient to punish and deter a parent from 
kidnapping his own child.273  As Joy M. Feinberg274 observes, contempt 
sanctions are often “inadequate and do not serve as a deterrent to custody or 
visitation interference.”275  Allowing the state to prosecute parental 
kidnappers under state criminal laws leads to increased punishments for this 
serious crime, better protecting custodial parents and children from future 
abductions.276  Furthermore, sanctions for criminal contempt do not compel 
the violating parent to return his child to the custodial parent.277  In contrast, 
state criminal law provisions often include instructions requiring the child 
 
270  Id. at 366. 
271  Id. 
272  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16–10–108 (West 2016); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 
1218(a) (West 2007); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 4137(c) (West 1995). 
273  See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16–10–108 (West 2016) (limiting sanctions for criminal 
contempt of court to 30 days’ imprisonment); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218(a) (West 2007) 
(limiting sanctions for criminal contempt of court to a $1,000 fine or five days’ 
imprisonment); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 4137(c) (West 1995) (limiting sanctions for 
criminal contempt of court to a $100 fine or imprisonment for no more than 30 days). 
274  Partner in the Chicago matrimonial law firm of Boyle & Feinberg, P.C.  
275  Joy M. Feinberg & Lori S. Loeb, Custody and Visitation Interference: Alternative 
Remedies, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 271, 276 (1994) (citing Lawrence A. Goldman, 
Tortious Interference with Visitation Rights: A New and Important Remedy for Non-
Custodial Parents, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 307, 313 (1986)). 
276  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–26–502(a) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–4–401(a)(3) 
(West 2015); CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (West 2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 1103(3) 
(West 2016); § 1103(3) (West 2015). 
277  Bentch, supra note 42, at 380 (citing Katz, Legal Remedies for Child Snatching, 15 
FAM. L.Q. 103, 113 (1981) (criminal sanctions do not themselves guarantee child’s return or 
pr[o]vide remedy to wronged parent)). 
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to be returned to the custodial parent or lawful custodial from whom the 
child was taken.278 
Therefore, in order to adequately punish and deter parental 
kidnapping—a crime that causes serious, long-term harm—courts should 
not allow the double jeopardy rule to protect criminal contemnors from 
subsequent prosecution under state criminal laws for parental kidnapping. 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, courts should not treat criminal 
contempt and parental kidnapping as the same offense under the double 
jeopardy rule. Due to the material differences between the crimes of 
parental kidnapping and contempt of court, giving the state power to 
prosecute under its parental kidnapping statutes would not cause any person 
to “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb.”279  Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause should not bar prosecution for 
parental kidnapping based on a prior conviction for criminal contempt of 
court.  Furthermore, criminal prosecution under state statutes is a more 
consistent and adequate form of punishment for parental kidnapping than 
criminal contempt of court.  Therefore, all courts should hold that the state 
may prosecute contemnors for parental kidnapping, regardless of whether 
they have already received criminal sanctions for contempt of court. 
  
 
278  See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10–5(h)(i) (2010) (“If during the course of an 
investigation under this Section the child is found in the physical custody of the defendant or 
another, the law enforcement officer shall return the child to the parent or lawful custodial 
from whom the child was concealed, detained, or removed, unless there is good cause for the 
law enforcement officer or the Department of Children and Family Services to retain 
temporary protective custody of the child pursuant to the Abused and Neglected Child 
Reporting Act.”); MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (2009) (“A child who has been concealed, obtained, 
or retained in violation of this section shall be returned to the person having lawful custody 
of the child.”). 
279  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
5. BRUMMEL 3/1/2017  5:55 PM 
354 BRUMMEL [Vol. 106 
 
